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APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
These are companion cases filed by plaintiff, Producers
Livestock Loan Company, against the respective defendants to
collect the balances claimed due on promissory notes.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The actions were dismissed upon motions of the defendants,
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the court holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction ove:
the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of Dismissal
and further seeks reinstatement of its action in the Distr'.:
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff in these actions is a Utah Corporation with
offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is engaged in the
business of agricultural lending.

Defendants are residents

of the State of New York.
Plaintiff filed separate actions against each of the
two defendants in the District Court of Salt Lake County
alleging that they owed to plaintiff balances due on promiss:·
notes (R-2-M, R-2-L). 1

Defendants were served in the State·

New York and plaintiff claimed jurisdiction under the long'~
statute by reason of the following allegations in plaintiff;
complaint:
"5. That plaintiff's only place of business
is in Salt Lake City, Utah; that the defenda~t
made application for his loan at Salt Lake C~ty,
Utah· that the terms of the note provide for pay:
'
ose or
ment at Salt Lake City, Utah; that ~he purp dthe loan was for the financing of livestock an
~------------------

1. References to the Miller record will be followed with the letter '.i,:
and references to the Levatich record will be followed by letter
- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feed· and that defendant's livestock manager
cond~cted all of its business activities on
behalf of defendant in Salt Lake City, Utah;
and that the activities of defendant within
the State of Utah, both personally and by
his managing agent, constitute the transaction of business within this State to safisfy
the Utah Long Arm Statutes. "
(R-2-M, R-2-L).
Defendants filed motions to dismiss challenging the
jurisdiction of the court (R-15-M, R-4-L).

The motions

contained affidavits from the defendants alleging in effect
that all of their dealings with plaintiff were in the State
of New York and that they understood when they signed the
promissory notes that they were simply becoming passive
investors in cattle herds in Arizona and California.

There-

after defendants took the depositions of George M. Smith
(plaintiff's general manager) and George L. Smith (a former
employee of plaintiff, engaged in the business of cattle
management), and plaintiff filed affidavits in opposition
to the motions to dismiss.
The facts upon which plaintiff primarily relies to
establish long arm jurisdiction, and which for the purpose
of defendant's motion and this appeal must be considered
as true, are set forth in the affidavit of George L. Smith
filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss (R-66-M, R-42-L).
In that affidavit George L. Smith states as follows:

- 3 -
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"l. That for several years he has been engaged
in the business of managing cattle and livestock as
an agent for others.
2. That in the late fall of 1972, he was contacted by a Mr. Walter Ulicny, who represented himsel;
to be an investment advisor for Peter S. Levatich and.
John Clair Miller.
3. That Mr. Ulicny asked affiant i f he would be
willing to manage a livestock operation for his client;
Levatich and Miller; that affiant agreed to manage the
cattle through a corporation to be known as GLS Live·
stock Management, Inc. which affiant intended to form,
and did in fact form in the year 1973.
4. That thereafter, Levatich and Miller applied
for financing with Producers Livestock Loan Company
in Salt Lake City, Utah and affiant learned a loan and
a line of credit had been approved.
5. That thereafter, affiant and GLS Livestock
Management, Inc. undertook to manage the livestock
operations of Levatich and Miller and from November
30, 1972 through approximately June 10, 1974 made
purchases of cattle and feed, placed the cattle in
feed lots, assumed responsibility for the care of t~e
cattle and made periodic inspections from time t? time
and made sales of cattle, all on behalf of Levat1ch
and Miller.
6. That in addition, affiant and GLS Livestock
Management, Inc. sent a written report directly to
Levatich and Miller each month fully advising them
as to all purchases, all sales, and the current value
of their respective livestock.
7. That during the period of time in wh~ch
affiant managed livestock for Levatich and Miller,
affiant's office and the office of GLS Livestock h
Management, Inc. was located in Salt Lake City, Uta'
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and that neither myself nor GLS Livestock Management,
Inc. had offices in any other place.
8. That many purchases and sales of livestock
were consummated by telephone from Salt Lake City,
Utah.
9. That all monthly reports to Levatich and
Miller were prepared in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
sent to them on letterhead bearing a Salt Lake City
address.
10. That I executed drafts against Miller and
Levatich's lines of credit at Producers Livestock
Loan Company, all of said drafts having been executed
in Salt Lake City, Utah.
11. That I kept Miller and Levatich fully informed
on a month to month basis as to the status of their
loan and the amount of draws against their line of
credit.
12. That up to the date of this affidavit, neither
Levatich nor Miller, although receiving reports from
me on a monthly basis, had never questioned my authority
to purchase cattle on their behalf, to purchase feed
on their behalf, to care for their cattle, to execute
drafts against their line of credit, or to sell cattle
on their behalf, and in general manage their livestock
operations."
After the motion to dismiss was argued and submitted,
the court in its memorandum decision concluded that the Utah
Courts would have jurisdiction over the defendants if George

L. Smith was their agent; then the court surprisingly concluded as a matter of law that he was not an agent of the
defendants (R-96-M, R-47-M). 2 The trial court thereupon
1

'· 80
~ court noted in its maooranch.m decision that both parties relied
.e1Yon the deposition of George L. Smith as the sole matter of
~~71 d:rice; this statenent is incorrect in that plaintiff relied upon
) :~lete record and particularly the affidavit of George L. Smith
·'''· ~ ~ias argued fran at the t:Ure the rrotion was heard.
1
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dismissed plaintiff's actions.

The sole issue on appeal

relates to the question of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE COURT
LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS.

Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated provides that
the courts of this state shall have jurisdiction as to any
claim arising from:
"(1) The transaction of any business within
this state."
Section 78-27-23, Utah Code Annotated defines "transaction
of business within this state" to mean "activities of a
non-resident person, his agents, or representatives in this
state which affect persons or businesses within the State
of Utah".

The policy of the legislature is further made

clear in Section 78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated which mandat<s
that jurisdiction over non-residents is to extend to the
fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.

The Constitution would allow

jurisdiction if a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state that traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice are not offended by the forum's
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exercise of jurisdiction over the case.

International Shoe

Company Vs. Washington, 326 U.S. 310.
Many Utah cases have interpreted our long arm statute,
but the most recent and most significant case relied upon
by the plaintiff is Packaging Corporation of America Vs.
~·(March,

1977) 561 P. 2d 680.

In Morris, a Nevada

resident signed a document in which he agreed to guarantee
to plaintiff the debt of a cookie business in Utah in which
he had a financial interest as a stockholder.

The cookie

business failed and defendant was sued in Utah to make good
on his guarantee.

Defendant claimed he was not a resident

'here, that his contacts with the State of Utah were minimal,
and that he could only be sued in the State of Nevada.

The

court held that the defendant was subject to suit in Utah
and based jurisdiction primarily upon the presence of an

agent.

In its opinion the court stated as follows:
" . . . the evidence does not disclose that

~efe~dant had a telephone listing or did advertising
in his name and, of course, the offices and plants
of Hawkeye were not in defendant's name. But,
defendant's agent was in Utah and performed continuous duties in Utah in overseeing the business of
Hawkeye and hence defendant's interests therein for
most of 1971 and into 1972. The agent's duties and
contacts were not sporadic and transitory. Certainly
Haw~e~e. had local offices and property in Utah and
activities of the defendant's agent at those offices
constituted a substantial business presence in this
state."

- 7 -
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The instant case is essentially the same as above.
Defendants had an agent in the State of Utah to manage their
cattle business.

The agent's contacts with Utah were not

sporadic, but were continuous.

Utah was the only place

where the agent had an office, and was the place from where
the agent's business was transacted.

The activities of the

agent at its office in Salt Lake City, Utah constituted a
substantial business presence in the State of Utah.
The trial judge commented in his memorandum decision
that just because George L. Smith referred to himself as
defendant's agent did not make him so.

Appellant most cer·

tainly agrees that the conclusion of any party as to his
legal relationship is not very relevant.

By the same token,

the characterization by defendants that Smith was not their
agent is likewise not very significant.

The thing that is

important is what the parties actually did.

Agency is

created when there is a manifestation in some way (includ·
ing acquiescence by the principal in a series of acts) that
the agent may act on the others account (Restatement of
Agency 2d, §15).

No written contract is required and

the relationship is established by any conduct of the
principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent
to believe that the principal desires him to so act on
the principal' s account.

(Restatement of Agency 2d, §2 6)
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The evidence in the case before the court shows that for
a period of some one and one-half (1 1/2) years George
L. Smith managed the livestock operations of the defendants;
he made purchases on their behalf, placed cattle in feed
lots, made inspections, assumed responsibility for care,
and made sales from time to time.

He sent the defendants

monthly reports during the one and one-half (1 1/2) year
period advising them as to the sales, purchases and values
of their livestock.

He executed drafts against plaintiff's

line of credit in order to make purchases.

During the

entire one and one-half (1 1/ 2) years in which monthly
reports were given, the authority of George L. Smith to
manage defendants' livestock operations was never questioned
or challenged by either of them.

In light of these facts,

it is difficult to see how the trial judge could have
concluded without any evidenciary hearing that George L.
Smith was not an agent of the defendants.
Defendants made the argument to the trial court that
because, Smith, the manager, made decisions as to what
cattle to buy, where to place them, when to sell, etc. ,
that somehow they gave up their control, which changed
the relationship from one of agency to that of buyer and
seller of an investment contract.

Smith did testify
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that he did in fact make these decisions for the defendants
(George L. Smith Deposition, Page 22).

However, there is

nothing whatsoever in the record before the court to even
remotely suggest that defendants ever contracted or gave
up the right to control their agent.

In any event, the

term "investment contract" is generally used in connection
with Federal and State securities statutes to denote types
of transactions requiring registration.

Any common enter-

prise entered into with a profit motive wherein the investor
relies upon a third person to manage the venture or other·
wise make it profitable is an "investment contract".
SEC vs. Howey Company, 328 U.S. 293.

See

Many types of invest·

ment contracts involve agency agreements, and the terms are
not by any means mutually exclusive.

Plaintiff is unaware

of any authority holding the concept of investment contract
to have any application to establishing the jurisdiction
of the court.
It is further generally held that where conflicting
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the question
of agency is one of fact for the jury or the trier of fact.
3 Am Jur 2d Agency, §359; see also Johnson vs. Hardman,
6 Utah 2d 421, 315 P. 2d 854.

In light of the plaintiff's

allegations, as have been set forth in this brief, the

- 10 -
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:~e

trial court erroneously concluded that reasonable

:ninds could not find an agency relationship between George
L. Smith and the defendants such as would establish long

arm jurisdiction over them.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and authorities as cited
herein, appellant respectfully requests the court to
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
David E. West
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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